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LET THE DAMAGES FIT THE WRONG: AN IMMODEST
PROPOSAL FOR REFORMING PERSONAL INJURY
DAMAGES
Elaine W. Shoben*
The modern legislative approach to tort reform has been a
piecemeal process of altering single rules rather than reconsidering the
fundamental principle of compensatory damages—the goal of making
victims whole. When some aspect of damage doctrine has become
disfavored, such as joint and several liability, legislatures1 and
sometimes courts2 have made a change in that one rule.3 Lawmakers
have focused little on the overall remedial scheme in tort4 and even less
on the basic premise of compensatory damages and whether it is still
justifiable.
Rather than comment on the wisdom of piecemeal reform, this
*
Judge Jack and Lulu Lehman Professor of Law, Boyd School of Law, University of Nevada, Las
Vegas. Edward W. Cleary Professor Emerita, University of Illinois College of Law. The author
wishes to thank Marsha Peterson for her research assistance and her colleagues at the Remedies
Forum, University of Louisville 2005, as well as colleagues at the Boyd School of Law faculty
workshop for their many useful comments.
1. State legislatures have taken a variety of actions on this specific rule—abolishing it,
modifying it, or applying it only to particular types of recovery. See, e.g., COLO. REV. STAT. § 1321-111.5 (West 2001) (abolishing joint liability in personal injury actions); N.J. STAT. ANN. §
2A:15-5.3 (West 2001) (modifying rule such that a defendant less than 60% responsible is severally
liable only); Cal. Civ. Code § 1431.1 (West 2001) (stating that liability of each defendant for
noneconomic damages is severally liable only).
2. See, e.g., Degener v. Hall Contracting Corp., 27 S.W.3d 775 (Ky. 2000).
3. The same process has occurred with other isolated doctrines, such as the collateral source
rule. It has come under legislative attack in some jurisdictions with resulting abolition or
modification of the rule in some states. See, e.g., COLO. REV. STAT. § 13-21-111.6 (West 2000)
(abolishing the rule—court shall reduce the verdict by the amount of any collateral payments not
paid as a result of a contract entered into and paid for by or on behalf of the plaintiff); Ind. Code
Ann. § 34-44-1-3 (West 2001) (modifying the rule—proof of collateral benefits shall be considered
by the trier of fact in assessing damages).
4. For a helpful discussion of medical malpractice statutory reforms, see Catherine M.
Sharkey, Caps and the Construction of Damages in Medical Malpractice Cases, in MEDICAL
MALPRACTICE AND THE U.S. HEALTH CARE SYSTEM: NEW CENTURY, DIFFERENT ISSUES 148-66
(Rogan Kersh & William Sage, eds. Cambridge University Press) (forthcoming 2006).

1069

Published by IdeaExchange@UAkron, 2006

1

Akron Law Review, Vol. 39 [2006], Iss. 4, Art. 9
SHOBENFINAL.DOC

1070

2/26/2007 10:31:53 AM

AKRON LAW REVIEW

[39:1069

article questions the premise of compensatory damages and takes the
position that make-whole recovery is an unnecessary consequence of
liability and does not necessarily achieve just results. With apologies to
Gilbert and Sullivan who contributed the refrain “[L]et the punishment
fit the crime,”5 I propose that civil damages should fit the wrong.6
Compensatory damages should abandon the make-whole premise and be
measured by three factors: the degree of the wrongfulness of the tort, the
severity of the harm, and the extent to which the risky conduct was
directed at the plaintiff—which I call connectedness.
The popular outrage at highly-publicized tort cases7—or caricatures
of those cases—is directed not at the fact of liabitiy but at the amount of
damages. One can only speculate how the public would have reacted to
the McDonald’s coffee case8 if the headline had read “Woman Recovers
Ten Thousand Dollars After Receiving Burn from Scalding Hot Coffee.”
Similarly, one wonders how the public would respond to a headline
“Drunken Surgeon Pays Millions to Patient After Botched Operation.”
If society’s sense of justice demands that a drunken surgeon pay more
for botching an operation than a restaurant pay for serving scalding
coffee, then why should the recovery turn on the circumstances of the
plaintiff’s loss? It is entirely possible that the botched operation caused
less damage than the scalding coffee. Maybe the surgeon removed a
healthy appendix instead of a cyst and the patient simply needed a
second surgery. Maybe the scalding coffee caused second degree burns
in the crotch when it spilled between the patron’s legs.9 Although tort
liability should not turn on a public opinion poll, the purpose of this
observation is to suggest that notions of fundamental justice do not
require the make-whole rule. Other rules might serve societal goals as
well.
My suggested reform of the compensatory principle of personal
5. W.S. GILBERT & ARTHUR SULLIVAN, THE MIKADO, in THE COMPLETE PLAYS OF
GILBERT AND SULLIVAN 343, 382 (1936).
6. My apologies must extend to Professor Jeffrey G. Sherman as well. He wrote a wonderful
piece explaining how W.S. Gilbert and his work have been misunderstood, but I am simply adding
on to the popular misuse. See Jeffrey G. Sherman, Law’s Lunacy: W.S. Gilbert and His Deux ex
Lege, 83 OR. L. REV. 1035 (2004).
7. For a thoughtful account of the tort crisis, including a critique of the metaphors used for
the “torts crisis” and the types of cases portrayed as “bad,” see Deborah L. Rhode, Too Much Law,
Too Little Justice: Too Much Rhetoric, Too Little Reform, 11 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 989 (1998).
8. There is no reported opinion of this highly-publicized trial in New Mexico, Liebeck v.
McDonald’s Restaurants, P.T.S., Inc., but it is famous enough to be referenced by the Seventh
Circuit Court of Appeals in McMahon v. Bunn-O-Matic Corp., 150 F.3d 651, 654 (7th Cir. 1998).
9. Id. at 653 (explaining plaintiff’s injuries, which are analogous to plaintiff’s injuries in the
McDonald’s coffee case).
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injury damages would not necessarily favor either plaintiffs or
defendants.10 Its purpose is to cut transaction costs and to redistribute
personal injury compensation such that small claims would be more
viable than they are currently, and large claims would not produce a
windfall to attorneys or, through punitive damages, to litigants. The
tools to achieve these goals are: (1) altering the measure of
compensatory damages to subsume the wrongfulness of the conduct and
thus to eliminate punitive damages; and (2) permitting hourly attorney
fees for prevailing plaintiffs in place of contingency fees, thus increasing
the availability of representation for small claims without altering
availability for large claims.
The suggested reform would alter the basis for recovery and
produce results satisfying the other goals of tort law beyond the makewhole principle. Actors would be deterred from engaging in conduct
that risks injury to others and especially serious injury toward
identifiable victims. To the extent that some plaintiffs would not receive
full compensation for their losses, other societal safety nets are
necessary; that result is no different from the situation of plaintiffs who
are injured by conduct that is not tortious or that is committed by actors
who are judgment-proof. The proposed scheme meets other goals of tort
law: deterrence, retribution, and a societal sense of justice.
Compensation is still present as well, but the goal of make-whole
compensation is not.
This proposed reform permits compensatory damages on the basis
of three factors: the degree of the wrongfulness of the tort, the severity
of the harm, and the closeness of the connection between the wrong and
the harm. The resulting damages combine some (but only some)
elements of traditional compensatory damages (the severity of the
harm)11 with some elements from punitive damages (the wrongfulness of
the conduct)12 and some elements of legal causation (connectedness).13
By necessity, the new approach would replace both compensatory and
punitive damages and would not be governed by the existing law related
to those standards. The connectedness requirement would supplement
other proximate cause inquiries to proportion liability for remotely

10. The lack of favor to one interest group may well make this piece academic in all senses of
the word. Without an interest group to promote such a legislative scheme, it has little chance of
passage. Nonetheless, cynicism should not prevail to dampen public discussion of the issues.
11. For shameless self-promotion, see ELAINE W. SHOBEN, WILLIAM MURRAY TABB &
RACHEL M. JANUTIS, REMEDIES: CASES AND PROBLEMS ch. 11 (3d ed., Foundation Press, 2002).
12. Id. at ch. 15.
13. Id. at ch. 13.
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caused injuries. Concepts of contributory and comparative negligence
remain and function to reduce recovery in much the same manner as
current law.14
A significant goal of this proposed reform is to provide a more
consistent and predictable framework for assessing damages.15
Consistency and predictability would foster the goal of compensating a
greater number of tort victims in levels proportionate to the degree of
injury and wrong to the level of monetary recovery. Consistency and
predictability also foster settlement and thus reduce the transaction costs
of trial preparation. A more predictable amount of liability, with interest
dating from the time of filing suit, fosters speedier settlement and
delivery of compensation to victims when they need the money for
rehabilitation. Finally, the proposal includes an award of attorney’s fees.
In place of contingency fees, plaintiff’s attorneys could recover fees on a
reasonable hourly basis. The extensive litigation surrounding such
awards in the civil rights context provides ample precedent for this
change.
I. THE PROPOSED THREE ELEMENTS FOR TORT DAMAGES
A. Degree of Wrongfulness
The first element of the proposed reform measure of personal injury
damages is the degree to which the defendant’s conduct was wrongful.
Practitioners have long recognized that this factor is already one that
affects juries even though the judge does not include it in the instructions
for measuring compensatory damages.16 It is frequently noted, for
example, that negligence is “hot” and strict liability is “cold” such that a
14. Id. at ch. 11.
15. See Catharine Pierce Wells, A Pragmatic Approach to Improving Tort Law, 54 VAND. L.
REV. 1447 (2001).
16. Conventional wisdom has been scientifically documented.
[J]urors in tort cases seek ‘total justice’ in a number of interrelated senses. . . . It is in this
sense that jurors’ susceptibility to the hindsight effect and inability to disregard certain
pieces of information come into play. This “holistic” approach to jury decision making
often leads jurors to make global judgments about who did what to whom, who should
pay for it, and how much, rather than separating judgments about liability and damages,
or about different types of damages, into discrete steps as the law requires. As a result,
jurors have a tendency to fuse discrete judgments into a jumbled, interrelated whole.
EDIE GREENE & BRIAN H. BORNSTEIN, DETERMINING DAMAGES: THE PSYCHOLOGY OF JURY
AWARDS 142 (American Psychological Association 2002) (citing NEAL FEIGENSON, LEGAL
BLAME: HOW JURORS THINK AND TALK ABOUT ACCIDENTS (American Psychological Association)
(2001)).
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good plaintiff’s attorney would never fail to put before a jury the facts
showing that risk was taken even if liability could be established without
negligence.17 The proposed reform elevates that concept to a legal
standard in measuring damages.
Consider five plaintiffs, each of whom suffers brain damage from
tortious conduct. Plaintiff One is a college student who was the victim
of a brutal beating by defendants who hated him because of his sexual
orientation. Plaintiff Two is an employed adult injured in an auto
accident caused by a drunk driver. Plaintiff Three is a baby who lost
oxygen to the brain during birth through the negligence of a resident
doctor in the hospital. Plaintiff Four is a baby whose mother ingested a
drug during pregnancy that caused brain damage to the developing fetus.
PLaintiff Five is a baby that was injured in an auto accident when the
child restraint device malfunctioned because of an unforeseen design
defect.
Assume that each of these five plaintiffs can establish liability and
that all five suffered permanent brain damage. Under modern damages
law, each of these brain-damaged plaintiffs would recover differing
amounts based upon the life circumstances of the five. All would
receive money for a lifetime of care. The babies would recover for a
lifetime of lost average wages. The recovery of the employed adult
would turn on his or her socio-economic status in terms of lost future
wages. The college student’s recovery would turn on the evidence of his
probable future earning capacity based upon his existing record. These
amounts will vary greatly on the basis of the legal standards applied to
damages, even without regard to the natural variability that one would
expect from the degree of uncertainty inherent in the calculation of these
amounts and the presentation of these issues before different factfinders.18 The amount actually received by each plaintiff will turn on
even more factors: the presence or absence of state statutory caps on
damages, tax calculations, estimates of future inflation, reduction to
present value, and so forth. Punitive damages may also be available for
17. Consider, for example, the asbestos injury claim in Owens-Corning Fiberglas Corp. v.
Ballard, 749 So.2d 483 (Fla. 1999). The plaintiff, a construction worker who developed lung
disease after working with defendant’s asbestos product for years, had two theories of liability: strict
liability and negligence. The negligence theory was that the company continued to manufacture the
product with asbestos rather than safer materials after it learned of the hazards of asbestos. This
theory also supported punitive damages on the grounds that the conduct displayed a reckless
disregard of the safety of others.
18. See generally JURY VERDICT RESEARCH, CURRENT AWARD TRENDS IN PERSONAL INJURY
(LRP 44th ed. 2005) (reporting wide ranges of recovery for similarly situated personal injury
victims).
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the first plaintiff and possibly for the second, but, absent additional facts,
not for the babies. Finally, whatever the final mystery sum becomes the
damages for each of these five, the plaintiff’s attorney will probably take
a third.
Under the proposed reform, the variability in recovery would turn
on the basis of the defendant’s liability. This factor would weigh
heavily against the brutal attackers of Plaintiff One. It would weigh
lightly against the defendant who injured Plaintiff Five, against whom
we have assumed liability that would have to be on the basis of absolute
liability.
B. Severity of the Harm
The second factor in the proposed reform is the severity of the harm
to the plaintiff. This factor is the one that most closely resembles current
law.19 A plaintiff who receives a scratch should receive less than one
with severe injuries, even if both were maliciously inflicted. Where the
proposal differs from current damage law, however, is that evidence
would be restricted to the most general kind of proof of the severity of
the injury. Juries would not hear about the projected costs of future
surgeries, for example, but would simply learn that the plaintiff’s
injuries are such that future surgeries will be necessary. Similarly,
plaintiffs could not produce evidence of projected future lost wages, but
they could prove the length of time for which it will not be possible to
work in establishing the severity of the harm.
This element, unlike the wrongfulness of the defendant’s conduct,
may cause over-deterrence in the same manner that it does in the current
tort system. When an actor takes a risk of a small harm to another but a
great harm occurs, the resulting civil “punishment” may be excessive to
the degree of harm risked. Tort law has long struggled with the
conflicting goals of compensation and deterrence in this context. The
factor of the severity of the injury remains an element of recovery in this
proposal as a compromise between the conflicting interests at stake.
Unlike modern law, this factor is only one of three, such that there will
still be large recovery for severely injured plaintiffs, but less so for those
who were unfortunate enough to suffer large injury when the defendant
took a small risk (or no risk for strict liability).

19. See JAMES M. FISCHER, UNDERSTANDING REMEDIES 369, 369-423 (Matthew Bender &
Co. 1999) (discussing remedies for various bodily injuries).
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C. Connectedness between Defendant’s Wrong and Plaintiff’s Injury
The final element of the three proposed factors is the extent to
which the actor’s risk was connected to the plaintiff’s harm. Although
issues of connectedness affect the substantive question of liability
through proximate cause and other doctrines, this issue is appropriately
reintroduced as a damages limitation capable of assessment on a sliding
scale.
Injuries that are remote in time or space may not be the legal, or
proximate, cause of the harm, and such lack of connectedness may
preclude all liability. For those cases that survive to damages, the
connectedness limitation ought to be a factor in determining the amount
of damages. Injuries that are remotely connected to the wrong in terms
of time or space are less compelling cases for compensation than those
that are closely connected. The DES daughters cases,20 for example,
involved liability for the effects of medication that occurred a generation
later when adult women were adversely affected by an anti-miscarriage
pill taken by their mothers when the daughters were in utero. Once
liability is found, it would be appropriate under this proposal to make the
remoteness of the injury a factor in the damage assessment.
Connectedness takes many forms. First, reconsider the famous set
of hypothetical plaintiffs in Judge Andrews’ dissenting opinion in
Palsgraf v. Long Island Railroad.21 A car accident unforeseeably causes
an explosion of dynamite, and individuals are injured both near and far
from the accident. Judge Andrews argues that recovery ought to depend
on how naturally the chain of events flowed from the accident. He
criticized the majority opinion written by Judge Cardozo for artificially
limiting liability to those individuals who were foreseeably injured at the
time of the negligent act, specifically, those who were within the
contemplation of the actor at the time of the risk. Many jurisdictions
follow the Cardozo rule to limit liability as a matter of substantive law,
but many others continue to permit more remotely foreseeable plaintiffs.
When those claims survive to the damage stage, it is appropriate under
this proposal to factor in the remoteness of the claim in the calculation of
damages.
II. REPLACEMENT OF CONTINGENCY FEES IN PERSONAL INJURY CASES
The “American Rule” with respect to attorney’s fees holds that each
20. See Sindell v. Abbott Lab., 26 Cal.3d 588 (1980).
21. 248 N.Y. 339, 353 (N.Y. 1928) (Andrews, J., dissenting).
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party bears its own costs of litigation. Attorneys’ fees are traditionally
not awarded to the prevailing party in litigation absent an exception.
Those exceptions include statutory authorization, contractual agreement,
and certain equitable considerations such as bad faith litigation. The
American Rule is distinguished from the approach used by jurisdictions
sharing our Anglo legal heritage that allows the prevailing party to
recover attorney’s fees.22
The function of the American Rule in personal injury cases is to
make recovery of fees for the plaintiff’s attorney based on a contingency
contract. In the typical contingency contract, the plaintiff’s attorney
recovers no fees unless the claim produces a monetary award or
settlement. In that event, the attorney typically recovers a third of the
award.
The usual policy consideration that supports the American Rule is
that imposing fees may discourage the legitimate use of the court system
and be difficult to measure. A frequent objection to the rule is that it
encourages litigation by not penalizing losers.23
The last half of the twentieth century has produced data that should
alter the assessment of the policy considerations affecting the American
Rule. Fee-shifting in civil rights and employment discrimination cases
has produced an ample body of case law and practical experience with
fee-shifting in favor of prevailing plaintiffs24 and, in rare cases, for
prevailing defendants.25 The same scheme could profitably be used for
personal injury plaintiffs.
The Civil Rights Attorney’s Fees Awards Act of 197626 provides
that the court, in its discretion, may allow the prevailing party to recover
a reasonable attorney’s fee as part of the costs. Title VII of the Civil
Rights Act of 196427 makes a similar provision for employment
discrimination litigants. Courts presumptively allow recovery of fees to
the successful plaintiff under these statutes and do not require a showing
of bad faith. The calculation of fees is based on a number of factors.28
22. On the role of attorney’s fees as a deliberate remedy, see the general discussion in the
Supreme Court’s opinion in Alyeska Pipeline Serv. Co. v. Wilderness Soc’y, 421 U.S. 240, 264 n. 39
(1975).
23. The Supreme Court discusses these principles generally in a copyright case involving
attorney’s fees. Fogerty v. Fantasy, Inc., 510 U.S. 517, 522-31 (1994).
24. See, e.g., Newman v. Piggie Park Enter., Inc., 390 U.S. 400, 401-02 (1968).
25. Christiansburg Garment Co. v. EEOC, 434 U.S. 412, 421 (1978).
26. 42 U.S.C.§ 1988.
27. 42 U.S.C.§ 2000e.
28. The Supreme Court endorsed the “lodestar” method for calculation of statutory attorney’s
fees—a reasonable hourly rate multiplied times the number of hours reasonably expended—in
Hensley v. Eckerhart, 461 U.S. 424, 433 (1983). In that case it further endorsed the factors for
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The federal fee-shifting statutes typically provide for the recovery
of attorney fees to the “prevailing party” or “prevailing plaintiff.” The
Supreme Court has held that a party is prevailing within the meaning of
the Civil Rights Attorney’s Fees Awards Act “when actual relief on the
merits of his claim materially alters the legal relationship between the
parties by modifying the defendant’s behavior in a way that directly
benefits the plaintiff.”29 The same approach could be used for personal
injury plaintiffs.30
Although many federal fee-shifting statutes provide for the
recovery of attorney fees to the “prevailing party,” the Supreme Court
has applied a higher standard for awarding fees to successful defendants.
It has held that a prevailing plaintiff in a Title VII discrimination case
under the Civil Rights Act of 1964 ordinarily will receive a fee award
absent special circumstances, but a prevailing defendant can recover fees
only by showing that the plaintiff’s claim was “frivolous, unreasonable,
or without foundation, even though not brought in subjective bad
faith.”31 The dual standard was justified to encourage private attorney
general suits to protect civil rights while also to shield such claimants
from potential fee liability when the suit was meritorious yet
unsuccessful.
Although the private attorney general rationale does not apply to
personal injury plaintiffs, the experience with fee-shifting in this body of
law can support a statutory scheme for personal injury plaintiffs that
would overtly apply a different standard for prevailing plaintiffs and

determination of the reasonable fee in Johnson v. Georgia Highway Express, Inc. 488 F.2d 714 (5th
Cir. 1974). The Court in Johnson identifies 12 factors: (1) the time and labor required; (2) the
novelty and difficulty of the questions; (3) the skill requisite to perform the legal service properly;
(4) the preclusion of employment by the attorney due to acceptance of the case; (5) the customary
fee; (6) whether the fee is fixed or contingent; (7) time limitations imposed by the client or the
circumstances; (8) the amount involved and the results obtained; (9) the experience, reputation, and
ability of the attorneys; (10) the “undesirability” of the case; (11) the nature and length of the
professional relationship with the client; and (12) awards in similar cases. Id. at 717-19.
29. Farrar v. Hobby, 506 U.S. 103, 111-12 (1992).
30. The issue is the policy question of whether to encourage the advancement of this type of
litigation through the use of attorney’s fees. The Supreme Court addressed the related question in
Fogerty v. Fantasy, Inc., 510 U.S. 517 (1994), where the Court held that a prevailing defendant in a
copyright infringement action would be awarded fees on the same basis as a prevailing plaintiff
under the Copyright Act. The Court noted that the public interest concerns in advancing civil rights
were not equally present in the goals of the Copyright Act, and thus it did not use the approach
previously outlined in Christianberg Garment, 434 U.S. 412. See Fogerty, 510 U.S. at 526-27. The
Court nonetheless declined to follow the “British Rule,” which awards attorney fees as a matter of
course to the prevailing party, and it noted that the trial court still retains equitable discretion in
making the award. Id. at 534-35.
31. Christiansburg Garmet Co. v. EEOC, 434 U.S. 412, 421 (1978).
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defendants. Suits that are filed frivolously, unreasonably, and without
foundation can support attorney’s fees for defendants, but such findings
have been rare in civil rights cases. Plaintiffs would not be deterred
from filing reasonable claims for fear of fee liability, but plaintiff
attorneys would not recover more than a reasonable hourly fee for their
successful claims.
III. SCALES
The following illustrations are provided as only the most general
kind of examples of how such a system could work. It is a primitive
beginning to illustrate the potential for thinking along the lines of
measuring damages more simply. The idea is to take some kind of
indicator number (such as a percentage of the median house price in the
United States) and multiply it by some scale representing the severity of
the harm, the wrongfulness of the conduct, and the degree of connection
between the defendant’s wrong and the plaintiff’s injury. Then the
jurisdiction could use whatever comparative negligence rule it has
chosen. For purposes of this example, a pure comparative negligence
system has been assumed (and even further simplified for illustrative
purposes).
The scales here are meant only to illustrate how a jurisdiction could
construct such a system. The idea is to provide a scale with benchmark
examples with which to compare a current situation to the exemplars. I
have used driving exemplars because they are common and provide
simple comparisons. Thus, a case involving medical malpractice or
products liability, for instance, would be comparing the degree of
wrongfulness to the exemplars even though they relate to a different
kind of behavior.32 Judges are already accustomed to making such
comparisons when discussing cases for remittitur, and jurors could make
good use of the same kind of information.33
32. Reconsider the case of Owens-Corning Fiberglas Corp. v. Ballard, 749 So. 2d 483 (Fla.
1999), where the plaintiff, a construction worker, developed lung disease after working with
defendant’s asbestos product for years. The plaintiff established that the company continued to
manufacture the product with asbestos rather than safer materials after it learned of the hazards of
asbestos. This behavior would be analogous to a truck driver failing to use an accessible flare to
warn cars of his or her stalled truck in a roadway in the dark where there is a significant likelihood
of other vehicles crashing into truck—the example of reckless behavior on the sample scale of
wrongfulness.
33. See, e.g., Moore v. Comm’r of Internal Revenue, 53 F.3d 712 (5th Cir. 1995) (applying
Texas law: appropriate factors include comparisons of the nature of the wrong, the character of the
conduct involved, and the defendant’s degree of culpability); Alkire v. First Nat’l Bank of Parsons,
475 S.E.2d 122 (W.Va. 1996) (appropriate comparative factors include the relationship between the
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The reason for the “betweens” in the scale is to satisfy the
inevitable situations where the actual case seems to fall between two
situations.
A. Degree of wrongfulness
½ No wrongfulness; strict liability basis for recovery
1 Small negligence: Defendant took a small but unnecessary risk of
harm to others (such as inattention for a moment when driving)
3 Between small and common negligence
5 Common negligence: Defendant took an unnecessary risk of harm
to others (such as driving at the speed limit when road conditions
and/or visibility are too poor for driving that fast)
7 Between common and significant negligence
9 Significant negligence: Defendant took a large and unnecessary risk
of significant harm to others (such as a driver of a car racing across
train tracks to beat a fast approaching train)
11 Between significant negligence and gross negligence
13 Gross negligence: Defendant took large risk of harm with no social
utility to risk (such as drunk driving)
15 Between gross negligence and recklessness
17 Recklessness: Defendant acted deliberately in reckless disregard for
the safety of others (such as truck driver failing to use an accessible
flare to warn cars of a stalled truck in roadway in dark where there is a
significant likelihood of other vehicles crashing into the truck)
19 Between recklessness and malicious behavior
21 Malicious behavior by defendant directed toward plaintiff
specifically or toward a small group to which plaintiff belonged (such

harm from the defendant’s conduct and the damages and the reprehensibility of the defendant’s
conduct). See also Colleen P. Murphy, Judicial Assessment of Legal Remedies, 94 NW. U. L. REV.
153 (1999).
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as deliberately driving car into crowd on sidewalk)

B. Severity of the Harm
The scale for the severity of the harm to the victim contemplates a
crude division of injuries into categories based on degree of severity.
This scale does not contemplate special conditions of the victim. For
example, the injury to the hand of a concert pianist would not be a more
severe harm than the injury of an ordinary person’s hand. Similarly, the
“eggshell head” plaintiff who suffered greater harm than normally
expected from a certain type of injury would not receive compensation
for those additional injuries. It should be permissible, however, to
include the life expectancy of the victim as a factor relevant to the
severity of the harm, such that a permanent disability to a younger
person might be a step higher on the severity scale than a similar injury
to a retired person, simply because of the differing amount of
productivity that would be impaired over the remaining life expectancy.
1/4Technical injury only, no monetary loss
1/2 Minimal injury, no permanent effect, little productivity lost (such
as little or no time lost from work), small medical bills
1 Notable injury, treatment by specialists, some productivity lost
(such as some time lost from work or other consequences from
temporary disability) and medical bills beyond the “small” ones of a
minimal injury (such as broken bones)
3 Between notable and significant injury
5 Significant injury (which may include hospitalization) months lost
of work, and/or very large medical bills, with some permanent effects
but not a permanent and serious disability (such as loss of limb)
7 Between significant and permanent injury
9 Permanent and material injury that permanently alter ability to live
normally (such as loss of limb)
11 Between permanent and catastrophic injury
13 Catastrophic injury to formerly productive and healthy person who
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experiences significant impairment in the ability to work and enjoy
important aspects of life (e.g. paralysis)

C. Degree of Connection
This scale contemplates several factors that are also relevant in the
first instance to the determination of liability. Even when liability is
found, these factors should be relevant to the determination of damages:
the degree of connection in time and space; number and significance of
intervening events; relationship between plaintiff and defendant (versus
indirect contact through marketing); degree to which defendant is solely
responsible for the harm; and other factors that attenuate the injury from
the defendant’s wrongful conduct.
1/2Distant connection, because of time, space, intervening forces (such
as third persons who contributed to the injury), indirect relation of the
plaintiff to the defendant
3/4Between distant and direct
1 Direct connection between defendant’s wrong and plaintiff’s harm,
with little distance in time or space, no third party intervening forces,
and no other attenuating factors

Contribution: Degree of plaintiff’s own contribution to injury
1 No contributory negligence
3/4Plaintiff’s failure to use due care contributed 75% to the injury
1/2Plaintiff’s failure to use due care contributed 50% to the injury
1/4 Plaintiff’s failure to use due care contributed 25% to the injury

IV. FORMULAS AND ILLUSTRATIONS
A. Formulas
Once scales are established to define severity, wrongfulness, and
degree of connectedness, the crucial issue becomes how to relate the
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scales to recovery. A jurisdiction would need a formula that reflects its
values for compensating personal injury plaintiffs. The three factors of
severity, wrongfulness, and connectedness can be weighed in any
fashion. A simple formula would be most accessible, but a multiple
regression equation [y = (a x wrongfulness) + (b x severity) + (c x
connectedness) + K] would be most accurate at achieving the desired
results.
Jurisdictions would also need a monetary indicator to which to
apply the formula. It would be useful if the indicator were pegged to
some number that reflects inflation and economic trends. It could be a
fixed number that adjusts with the CPI, or it could be some number that
otherwise reflects economic conditions, such as some percentage of the
median price for homes.
For purposes of the following illustrations, I have chosen a simple
formula and an indicator pegged to the national median price of a home.
There is no magic to these choices; they simply show the practical dollar
effect of the proposal and produce results for the “ordinary case” that
reflect current trends in personal injury awards. If one begins by
observing the current median award in a run-of-the-mill personal injury
case, then it is possible to see how the award is altered respectively by
changes in the wrongfulness, severity, and connectedness.
B. Illustrations
The bottom line of these illustrations is that the proposal will keep
damages in the small cases small, but it will add attorney’s fees as an
incentive to have them resolved. The historically blockbusting personal
injury cases would yield lower damages under this proposal. The most
severely injured plaintiffs will not “win the lottery” in the tort system,
particularly not with a large punitive damage award, but they will still
have a large enough recovery to provide incentives for structured
settlements that can provide for them in their lifetimes.
The relatively large reduction in awards to severely injured
plaintiffs is tempered by the provision of reasonable attorney’s fees.
Therefore, in order to compare the recoveries for severely injured
plaintiffs in these illustrations to the recoveries of their current tort
plaintiff counterparts, it is necessary to reduce the current recoveries by
a third to reflect the typical one third contingency fee arrangement that
now prevails in such cases. Thus, under current law, a plaintiff who
wins an award of one and a half million dollars loses one third (half a
million dollars) to the attorney.
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In these illustrations, the forumula simply multiplies the
wrongfulness, severity, connectedness, indicator, and contribution. It is
mathematically the simplest formula based on the proposed scales
above.
For purposes of these illustrations, the indicator number roughly
represents ten percent of the national median price for a home, $20,000.
It has the advantage of providing a easy contrast for the differing
situations below.
1. Example # 1
Future defendant driver D and future plaintiff P were driving on a
freeway during a rush hour commute. D was fiddling with the radio and
therefore failed to see that the traffic had suddenly stopped. D’s car
crashed into the back of P’s car and caused P’s airbag to inflate. P
suffered a shoulder injury, which caused some medical expenses and a
little lost time from work.
If this case were to get to trial, the trier of fact might find the
following numbers in this situation:
Wrongfulness = small negligence = 1/2
Severity = minimal injury = 1/2
Connection = direct connection = 1
Contribution = no contributory negligence = 1
Formula: 1/2 x 1/2 x 1 x $20,000 x 1 = $5,000
Plus reasonable hourly attorney’s fees
Plus interest from date of accident
Example # 1 variations
If we discover that D was driving drunk at the time of the accident,
then the wrongfulness number goes to 13, and the calculation would be
13 x 1/2 x 1 x $20,000 x 1 = $130,000, plus attorney’s fees and interest.
If P negligently changed lanes in front of D when D was fiddling
with the radio, the comparative negligence rules of the jurisdiction
would reduce the award accordingly.
2. Example # 2
Defendant 1, a drunk driver, hits Plaintiff, a pedestrian, and caused
injuries that require several operations and preclude the Plaintiff from
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working for one year. The City, Defendant 2, contributed to injury by
failing to remove a dangerous object from side of road, which further
injured the Plaintiff who was thrown by the impact of the car. The
Plaintiff failed to look when stepping into the roadway.
If this case were to get to trial, the trier of fact might find the
following numbers in this situation:
Defendant 1 - drunk driver
Wrongfulness = gross negligence = 13
Severity = significant injury = 5
Connection = direct connection = 1
Contribution = contributory negligence = ½
Formula: 13 x 5 x 1 x $20,000 x 1/2 = $650,000
Plus reasonable hourly attorney’s fees
Plus interest from date of accident
Defendant 2 – city
Wrongfulness = minimal negligence = 1/2
Severity = significant injury = 5
Connection = distant connection = 1/2
Contribution = contributory negligence = 1/2
Formula: 1/2 x 5 x 1/2 x $20,000 x 1 = $25,000
Plus reasonable hourly attorney’s fees
Plus interest from date of accident
3. Example # 3
Reconsider the baby who was earlier hypothesized to suffer brain
damage in an auto accident from the unforeseen design defect in a child
restraint device. Assuming that the jurisdiction permits liability and that
the defect in the car seat, if knowable, would foreseeably cause harm to
a child in a car crash and thus be directly connected to the injury. The
trier of fact might find as follows:
Wrongfulness = technical = 1/4
Severity = catastrophic injury = 21
Connection = direct connection = 1
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Contribution = no contributory negligence = 1
Formula: 1/4 x 21 x 1 x $20,000 x 1 = $105,000
Plus reasonable hourly attorney’s fees
Plus interest from date of accident
The wrongfulness factor significantly reduces an award for a severe
injury, such as a products liability case. Although critics may say that
this reform is at the expense of innocent victims (such as this baby), the
counterargument is that jurisdictions could permit liability in such
circumstances without fear of exposing businesses to excessive liability
from multiple victims.34 Further, manufacturers would have a strong
incentive to cure such a defect once it is known (as under present law)
because the wrongfulness number would rise dramatically if the design
defect is not corrected once it is known.
The theory for the tradeoff in such a products liability case—
permitting liability with a smaller recovery plus attorney’s fees—is that
greater numbers of victims in products liability cases could recover more
predictably, yet defendants would not have unchecked exposure to
liability. Attorneys for plaintiffs would still have an incentive to prove
that the injury was caused by a defect because the costs of such a
successful investigation would be recoverable fees, and the novelty of
the claim would be an appropriate multiplier for the attorney’s fees, like
current civil rights law. Thus, the benefit of the current system in
uncovering behavior, such as product defects, that causes injuries would
not be lost because attorneys could still recover substantial fees even if
their clients do not receive very high awards. The clients would receive
enough of an award to support a good structured settlement or to
purchase a good annuity; thus, the injured parties would still have an
incentive to pursue their claims even in the absence of a possible
windfall. The manufacturer would have an incentive to settle quickly
with other claimants—thus distributing that possible windfall to other
victims who would recover more quickly—because of the mounting
costs of additional attorney’s fees and interest that will result from delay.
4. Example # 4
Defendants, homeowners, failed to fix boards on the front steps that
34. For a discussion of the inconsistencies in punitive damages awards under current law, see
the article in this forum, Caprice L. Roberts, Ratios, (Ir)rationality & Civil Rights Punitive Awards,
39 AKRON L. REV. 1019 (2006).
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they knew to be rotting. The defect was not obvious, but the boards
collapsed from the rot when Plaintiff, a social guest, fell through them
and suffered a broken ankle. The homeowners had forgotten to warn
Plaintiff about the rotting steps. Assume that Plaintiff’s status as a
visitor on the land would permit recovery in the jurisdiction. A fact
finder could find:
Wrongfulness = small negligence = 1
Severity = notable injury = 1
Connection = direct connection = 1
Contribution = no contributory negligence = 1
Formula: 1 x 1 x 1 x $20,000 x 1 = $20,000
Plus reasonable hourly attorney’s fees
Plus interest from date of accident
5. Example # 5
Defendant owns a large dog known to be vicious toward children,
but lets the dog run unrestrained. The dog attacked a child on the way
home from school and caused a permanent and disfiguring facial scar
from its bite. A trier of fact could find:
Wrongfulness = recklessness = 19
Severity = permanent injury = 9
Connection = direct connection = 1
Contribution = no contributory negligence = 1
Formula: 19 x 9 x 1 x $20,000 x 1 = $361,000
Plus reasonable hourly attorney’s fees
Plus interest from date of accident
V. CONCLUSION
The state of personal injury damages law is shockingly bad. The
public appears to have lost confidence in the tort system and, although
that loss of confidence may not be for reasons that I would consider the
“right” ones, this loss of confidence presents an opportunity to
reconsider the function and functionality of this area of the law.
Current personal injury damages law involves costly trial
preparation that yields a highly unpredictable monetary outcome even
when the defendant admits liability. This article proposes to streamline
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much of the personal injury damage law by creating gross categories of
injury and restricting proof of injury to evidence that relates only to
proper categorization. For example, matters such as the expense of adult
diapers for a lifetime would not be admissible, whereas medical bills
would be admissible as an indication of the severity of the injury. Most
notably, pain and suffering evidence would not be admissible, and such
awards would be subsumed by the overall severity of the injury
category.
Secondly, the proposed scheme would make the degree of the
defendant’s wrongfulness an overt basis for adjusting the personal injury
award. The propensity of juries to make such an adjustment without
instruction suggests that it should be permitted and done in a manner that
is transparent. The proposal is to have a scale of wrongfulness that
serves to adjust the award upwards or downwards, depending on
whether the conduct was malicious at one extreme or a matter of strict
liability at the other extreme. This scale would replace punitive damages
because it permits an adjustment of compensatory damages on the basis
of wrongfulness.
Third, the proposal includes an adjustment for connectedness,
meaning that the compensatory damages are adjusted downwards when
the facts show a remote connection between the defendant’s wrong and
the plaintiff’s injury. This factor supplements the proximate cause
inquiry. Whereas courts still may use the element of proximate cause to
deny liability altogether, the advantage of this element in the damage
calculation is that it permits liability to go forward—but to be reduced—
when the connection is remote. For example, when there are intervening
forces that separate the defendant’s negligence from the plaintiff’s
injury, recovery will be reduced, if it is permitted at all.
When these three factors of wrongfulness, severity, and
connectedness are determined numerically on a scale chosen by a
jurisdiction, they would need to be related to some monetary indicator—
some identifiable number fixed by the legislature and adjusted for
inflation, or perhaps pegged to some easily identifiable number such as a
percentage of the median home price at the time of the injury.
The formula used to relate the three factors of wrongfulness,
severity, and connectedness to the indicator would reflect the
jurisdiction’s public policy about the manner and degree that it wishes to
compensate personal injury victims.35 The formula could be complex or
35. See generally Rachel M. Janutis, The Struggle Over Tort and the Overlooked Legacy of
the Progressives and Populists, 39 AKRON L. REV. 943 (2006).
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simple. The advantage of a complex formula is that it can fine-tune
interests, but the disadvantage is its relative lack of accessibility and
transparency.
Finally, the resulting monetary award can be adjusted by the
jurisdiction’s rules on comparative negligence. This proposal does not
affect that area of the law, nor does it affect the substantive basis of
liability.
It simply proposes replacing the typical measures of
compensatory damages with these three factors.
Two important additional elements of recovery are reasonable
attorney’s fees for prevailing plaintiffs and interest from the time of the
accident. These factors promote early settlement and justify the overall
lower awards.
The advantages of this proposal are that more tort victims will
recover for their injuries with the assistance of counsel, and the amount
of the award will reflect not only the severity of their injuries, but also
the wrongfulness of the conduct and the degree to which the defendant’s
wrong is connected to the injury. With this re-focus on the nature of
compensatory damages, punitive damages can be eliminated because the
concepts underlying punitive awards are subsumed in compensatory
damages. Further, courts could permit changes in the substantive law of
torts without the concern of creating excessive liability. Finally, as a
result of the reduced costs of trial preparation, more dollars would reach
the pockets of the victims. A reconceptualization of compensatory
damages—ending the focus on compensation as the primary goal—
could advance tort reform far more than the special interest legislative
reforms of recent years.
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